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Abstract: The purpose of this research is to investigate the risk governance associated 
with bank performance in Indonesia and Malaysia from 2010 to 2014. The risk 
governance variables used in this study are board size, board meeting, risk committee 
size, and risk committee meeting. Moreover, the selected sample is using purposive 
sampling method. Using return on asset (ROA) and Tobin's Q to measure the bank 
performance, this study proved that risk governance has a positive relationship with 
return on an asset in Indonesia. These results support the FSB (2013) 
recommendation on improving the risk governance framework. Special supervision of 
risk needs to be taken to prevent risks that may occur in the bank's activities. 
However, this finding also revealed that the more risk committee meetings, the more 
the value of the company will reduce. The number of risk committee meeting which 
was held too often on Indonesian banks, actually provide less effective results. 
Therefore it is lowering the price of bank shares. Meanwhile, the results show the 
amount of risk in the banking committee meetings in Malaysia have a positive effect 
on ROA, and the number of risk committees has a positive effect on firm value.  
 
Keywords: Risk Governance, Risk Committee, Return on Asset, Tobin’s Q 
Intisari: Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menyelidiki tata kelola risiko yang terkait 
dengan kinerja bank di Indonesia dan Malaysia selama periode 2010-2014. Variabel-
variabel tata kelola risiko yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah ukuran dewan, 
rapat dewan, ukuran komite risiko, dan rapat komite risiko. Selain itu, sampel yang 
dipilih menggunakan metode purposive sampling. Menggunakan laba atas aset (ROA) 
dan Tobin's Q untuk mengukur kinerja bank , penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa tata 
kelola risiko memiliki hubungan yang positif dengan return on asset di Indonesia. 
Hasil ini mendukung rekomendasi FSB (2013) untuk meningkatkan kerangka kerja 
tata kelola risiko. Pengawasan khusus terhadap risiko harus diambil untuk mencegah 
risiko yang mungkin terjadi dalam kegiatan bank. Namun, temuan ini juga 
mengungkapkan bahwa semakin banyak komite risiko semakin banyak nilai 
perusahaan akan berkurang. Jumlah rapat komite risiko yang terlalu sering diadakan 
di bank-bank Indonesia, sebenarnya memberikan hasil yang kurang efektif, oleh 
karena itu menurunkan harga saham bank. Sementara itu, hasil menunjukkan jumlah 
risiko dalam rapat komite perbankan di Malaysia memiliki efek positif pada ROA dan 
jumlah komite risiko memiliki efek positif pada nilai perusahaan. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that occurred in 2008 turned out to have affected global 
finance (Sudarsono, 2009). The one that triggers this economic crisis is the failure of 
banks-corporate governance and financial institutions. The failure is due to some 
directors lack of experience in the financial industry and less attention to the risk 
management. The members of the risk committee also have lack of experience in risk 
management (FSB1, 2013).  
This global financial crisis impacted the Asian region in the form of declining 
economic growth and the occurrence of financial difficulties in some banks or 
financial institutions (Sudarsono, 2009). One of the countries affected by the crisis in 
Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2010). The crisis occurred as a result of excessive risk 
taken by banks and lack of experience of directors regarding the financial industry and 
its complexity (Bank Indonesia, 2009). The global crisis also affected the Malaysian 
economic system in the third quarter of 2008 and continued into the first quarter of 
2009. However, a robust financial system and comprehensive policy implementation 
prevent the Malaysian state from a prolonged bad economy (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2009). 
Based on the impact of the crisis that occurred in 2007-2008, the FSB evaluates 
the oversight of risk governance in financial institutions in several countries. The FSB 
groups the evaluation object into three parts: (i) all surveyed firms; (ii) firms identified 
by the FSB and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as global 
systemically that is important for the financial institutions, or G-SIFIs2; and (iii) firms 
                                                          
 
1 Financial Stability Board is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the 
global financial system. 
2
Global systemically critical financial institutions, 17 financial institutions identified by FSB and BCBS (FSB 2013). 
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that reside in advanced economies or emerging market and developing economies 
(EMDEs3). The results show that almost 50 percent of surveyed banks do not meet all 
the evaluation criteria4 (FSB, 2013).  Due to a large number of financial institutions 
that do not meet the evaluation criteria, the FSB sets out some recommendations to 
improve the risk of the governance framework. 
Studies on risk governance which mainly focus on banking performance are still 
limited. Most of the previous studies focus on corporate governance and its 
relationship with banking performance (Sari, 2010). Many empirical kinds of literature 
stated that banks with proper governance mechanisms generally have better financial 
performance, higher corporate values and higher stock returns (Battaglia and Gallo 
2015). Laeven and Levine's research (2009), which focus on conflicts between bank 
managers and owners, suggest that risk-taking by banks is a variation of shareholders 
comparative strength in the corporate governance structure of banks. Also, they stated 
that the relationship between banking risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance 
policies, and restrictions on bank activity depend heavily on the ownership structure of 
each bank. Binh and Tam's research (2014) proved that there are differences effect of 
corporate governance proxies on bank performance between Vietnam and Malaysia. 
Sari's research (2010) which measures corporate governance with its monitoring 
mechanisms shows that there is a negative relationship between monitoring 
mechanisms of internal control and banking performance. 
Some researchers examined the effect of risk governance on banking performance 
during the 2007-2008 global crisis; examples Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) and 
Battaglia and Gallo (2015). Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) analyze the effect of risk 
                                                          
 
3
Emerging market and developing economies, classification of advanced and developing countries based on World 
Bank World Development Indicators (FSB, 2013). 
 
4
Evaluation criteria set by FSB about firm’s approach toward risk governance, board responsibilities and practices, risk 
management function, and independent assessment of risk governance framework. See Thematic Review on Risk 
Governance (FSB 2013). 
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governance on banking performance in North America. They found that banks with 
better risk management structures performed better. Further research by Battaglia and 
Gallo (2015) examined risk governance in banking performance in China and India. 
The results show that risk governance has a positive effect on banking performance in 
both countries. 
The importance of risk governance and the limited research related to risk 
governance and banking performance are factors that motivate us to examine the 
effect of risk governance on banking performance on the scope of ASEAN. The 
ASEAN countries to be sampled are Indonesia and Malaysia. Existing researchers, 
namely Battaglia and Gallo (2015) focus on the countries of India and China. While 
previous researchers had never researched in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The selection of Indonesia and Malaysia as the samples is mainly because the two 
countries have differences in the governance structure. Indonesia uses two-tier5 
system, while Malaysia uses the one-tier system. Also, these two countries as ASEAN 
member countries face the ASEAN Economic Community6 (AEC). The 
implementation of AEC may be constrained by the weak governance in ASEAN 
countries (Chia, 2013). This makes ASEAN countries should implement good 
governance to compete with other countries. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and 
                                                          
 
5
 system governance structure where the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity known as 
a supervisory board, which has no executive functions, while in one tier system the board has a broader role. (FSB, 
2013).  
 
6
ASEAN Economic Community or AEC is the economic integration of free trade among ASEAN countries (ASEAN, 
2015). 
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Meckling, 1976). The relationship between shareholders and management arises 
because shareholders or owners do not have the skills to manage their own company. 
The limited ability of shareholders to oversee management activities can lead the 
manager behavior to improve their own wellbeing. If this condition occurs, there will 
be a conflict between agents and principals called agency problems (Taswan, 2010: 
114-115). The agency problem occurs because of differences information between 
shareholders and bank managers, which is called asymmetric information. 
The company can reduce the agency problem by applying corporate governance. 
Following one of the good governance principles that are transparency, management 
must transparently disclose information so that the owners know the information that 
is obtained only by the managers (KNKG, 2006). Moreover, the company owners 
consider that the management tends to not to avoid the risks at the time of decision 
making (Hendriksen and Van Breda, 2002: 221). Therefore by using the same 
principle, risk governance can also reduce agency problems by making transparent 
disclosures regarding risks. 
The implementation of good corporate governance can improve banks 
performance in long-term and can compete well in global business (Windah and 
Andono, 2013). Investors also tend to avoid banks that do not implement good 
governance. Investors believe the companies that implement good corporate 
governance have tried to minimize the risks of self-profitable decisions, thereby 
enhancing performance that can maximize corporate value (Windah and Andono, 
2013). 
 
2.2 Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory explains the reasons why the company has an incentive to 
provide financial statements to external parties. The impulse arises because there is 
asymmetric information between the company and the outsiders. The company knows 
more information and prospects compared to outside parties such as investors and 
creditors (Simanungkalit, 2009, in Susilowati and Turyanto, 2011). To reduce 
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asymmetric information, the company must disclose both financial and non-financial 
information (Retno, 2012). 
Signals received by external parties will be a consideration in determining 
decisions. The existence of a board or commissioner in a bank can assist managers in 
delivering signals to external parties. The board or commissioner may exercise 
oversight and make decisions in determining which reports can be submitted. Also, 
banks should disclose any risks associated with bank activities. The bank risk 
committee function is to manage the existing risks so that the risk does not give a 
negative value to external parties. 
 
2.3 Risk governance 
Risk governance applies the principles of good governance to the identification, 
assessment, management, and communication of risks (IRGC, 2015). Risk governance 
focuses on the risks that exist in the company. Risk governance has a framework 
through which the board and management establish the firm's strategy; articulate and 
monitor adherence to risk appetite and risk limits; and identify, measure and manage 
risks. (FSB, 2013 and BCBS 2015). The following Table 1 explains the differences 
between corporate governance and risk governance: 
Table 1 
Differences between Risk Governance and Corporate Governance 
 Corporate Governance Risk Governance 
Definition “A set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders 
which provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring 
performance.” (BCBS, 2015) 
"The principles of good governance 
to the identification, assessment, 
management, and communication of 
risks" (IRGC, 2015) 
Responsible 
party 
Board Board and risk committee 
Principles 1. Board members should be qualified 
for their positions, have a clear 
understanding of their role in 
corporate governance and be able to 
exercise sound judgment about the 
1. The board has overall 
responsibility for the bank, 
including approving and 
overseeing management's 
implementation of the bank's 
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affairs of the bank. 
2. The board of directors should 
approve and oversee the bank’s 
strategic objectives and corporate 
values. 
3. The board of directors should set 
and enforce clear lines of 
responsibility and accountability 
throughout the organization. 
4. The board should ensure that there 
is an appropriate oversight by senior 
management consistent with board 
policy. 
5. The board and senior management 
should effectively utilize the work 
conducted by the internal audit 
function, external auditors, and 
internal control functions. 
6. The board should ensure that 
compensation policies and practices 
are consistent with the bank’s 
corporate culture, long-term 
objectives and strategy, and control 
environment. 
7. The bank should be governed 
transparently. 
8. The board and senior management 
should understand the bank’s 
operational structure. 
strategic objectives, governance 
framework, and corporate culture. 
2. Board members should be and 
remain qualified, individually and 
collectively, for their positions. 
They should understand their 
oversight and corporate 
governance role and be able to 
exercise sound, objective 
judgment about the affairs of the 
bank. 
3. The board should define 
appropriate governance structures 
and practices for its own work. 
4. Senior management should carry 
out and manage the bank's 
activities in a manner consistent 
with the business strategy, risk 
appetite, remuneration, and other 
policies. 
5. The board of the parent company 
has the overall responsibility for 
the group and for ensuring the 
establishment and operation of a 
clear governance framework. 
6. Banks should have an effective 
independent risk management 
function. 
7. Risks should be identified, 
monitored and controlled on an 
ongoing bank-wide. 
8. An effective risk governance 
framework requires robust 
communication within the bank 
about risk. 
9. The bank’s board of directors is 
responsible for overseeing the 
management of the bank’s 
compliance risk. 
10. The internal audit function should 
provide independent assurance to 
the board and should support 
board and senior management in 
promoting an effective 
governance process. 
11. The bank’s remuneration structure 
should support sound corporate 
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governance and risk management. 
12. The governance of the bank 
should be adequately transparent 
to its shareholders, depositors, 
other relevant stakeholders, and 
market participants. 
13. Supervisors should guide and 
supervise corporate governance at 
banks. 
Sources: BCBS 2006, BCBS 2015, and IRGC 2015 
The FSB has also issued an example of an effective risk governance framework 
for the company. Figure 1 is an example of a risk governance framework along with 
an explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the board, the risk management 
function, and the independent assessment of the risk governance framework: 
Figure 1 
Example of Risk Governance Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: FSB, 2013 
 
1. Board: The board is responsible for ensuring that the firm has an appropriate 
risk governance framework given by the firm's business model, complexity 
and size which is embedded in the firm's risk culture. 
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2. Firm-wide risk management function: The CRO and risk management 
function are responsible for the firm's risk management across the entire 
organization, ensuring that the firm's risk profile remains within the risk 
appetite statement (RAS) as approved by the board. The risk management 
function is responsible for identifying, measuring, monitoring, and 
recommending strategies to control or mitigate risks, and reporting on risk 
exposures on an aggregated and disaggregated basis. 
3. Independent assessment of the risk governance framework: The independent 
evaluation of the firm's risk governance framework plays a crucial role in the 
ongoing maintenance of a firm's internal controls, risk management, and risk 
governance. It helps a firm accomplish its objectives by bringing a disciplined 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, 
control, and governance processes. This may involve internal parties, such as 
internal audit, or external resources such as third-party reviewers (e.g., audit 
firms, consultants) (FSB, 2013). 
 
2.4 Banking performance 
Performance refers to how adequately a financial firm meets the needs of its 
stockholders (owners), employees, depositors, and other creditors, and borrowing 
customers (Rose dan Hudgins, 2013, 167). Banking performance is measured for the 
improvement and bank activities control to make banks more effective and more 
competitive to other banks. 
This research uses ROA and Tobin's Q as a proxy of banking performance. ROA 
is a proxy from an accounting based perspective. ROA can measure overall 
profitability level (Kieso at al .: 700). Tobin's Q is a proxy from a market-based 
perspective. Tobin's Q can measure company value comprehensively. The value of 
Tobin's Q is measured through assets, liabilities, and equity. Tobin's Q is often used to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and performance in 
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companies and banks (Klapper and Love 2004, in Sudiyatno and Puspitasari, 2010 and 
Sari, 2010). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Board size and board meeting relationship with banking performance  
Board of directors is a board responsible for overseeing the management of the 
company (FSB, 2013).  Board responsibility is to oversee the risk management system 
and systems designed to ensure that the corporation obeys applicable laws, including 
tax, competition, labor, environmental, equal opportunity, health and safety laws. 
(OECD, 2015). 
There are two types of board of directors structures. The first one is two-tier 
boards that separate the supervisory function and the management function into 
different bodies. Such systems typically have a supervisory board composed of non-
executive board members and a management board consisting entirely of executives 
(OECD, 2015). This system is widely used in European countries such as Germany 
and the Netherlands. Indonesia is one of the countries that also use the two-tier 
system. The other one is unitary boards or one-tier boards, which bring together 
executive and non-executive board members (OECD, 2015).  This system is used by 
some countries such as the United States, Australia, and Malaysia. 
The number of the board of directors members in the bank may affect the 
effectiveness of bank performance. Some research examines the relationship between 
the board size or the number of boards of directors to performance, and the results 
vary. Dewayanto (2010) it is proved that there is a negative relationship between the 
board of directors size and the performance of banks. The results of his research 
considered the more board of directors,  the more reduced the performance of banking. 
Meanwhile, according to Kusumawati and Riyanto (2005), the number of board of 
directors has a positive relationship with banking performance. The more the members 
of the board in the banking increasing the level of supervision, the more improve the 
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banking performance will. Their results are supported by Binh and Tam (2014) 
research that found board size has a positive effect on banking performance.  
Research suggests that there is a positive relationship between board size and 
banking performance. Following the perspective of agency theory, the board of 
directors can control the opportunistic behavior of management and can align the 
interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen 1993, in Kusumawati and Riyanto, 
2005). Therefore, a growing number of board of directors will improve the 
supervisory function that encourages the improvement of banking performance. Also, 
according to signal theory, the increasing number of a director will be more 
comfortable in determining effective and efficient strategies to convey signals to 
external parties. This is due to the variation of the director's competencies and 
experiences. 
Board of directors also has meetings regularly. Central banks in Indonesia and 
Malaysia have established a minimum of meetings to be held by boards. Bank 
Indonesia shall appoint a board of directors meeting at least 4 (four) times a year. 
Meanwhile, Bank Negara Malaysia sets the board meeting at least 1 (one) time every 2 
(two) months. The number of meetings of the board of directors can be a measure of 
how effectively the board members perform their functions. The study of the 
relationship between the number of meetings held by the board and the performance of 
banking was conducted by Battaglia and Gallo (2015). They state that the variable 
number of board meetings negatively affects bank performance as measured by 
Tobin's q. Hadiprajitno's research (2013) found there is a positive relationship between 
the number of meetings and performance. This is caused by the idea that the more 
frequent the meetings are, the more the control of management quality will get 
affected. 
Research suggests that a board meeting has a positive effect on banking 
performance. Following agency theory, the board of directors can align the 
shareholder and the management interests. The more frequent meetings conducted by 
the board will remove asymmetries between shareholders and management (Jensen 
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1993, in Kusumawati and Riyanto, 2005). The frequency of more meetings will also 
give the board more time to make more effective decisions. This is slightly in line with 
the signal theory which states that the information will be a positive signal for external 
parties. 
 
H1.  Board size positively affects the performance of banks listed on the BEI and 
Bursa Malaysia. 
H2. Board meeting positively affects the performance of banks listed on the BEI and 
Bursa Malaysia. 
 
3.2 Risk committee size and risk committee meeting relationship with banking 
performance 
The risk committee focuses on the implementation of the risk management 
framework. The member of this committee should have the necessary knowledge and 
experience to provide effective oversight of banking risks (BCBS, 2015). A risk 
committee can also provide greater support for company executives who are given 
broad risk management responsibilities, resulting in a stronger focus at the board level 
on the adequacy of resources allocated to risk management (Tonello, 2012). The risk 
committee also held a meeting to discuss the activities. Meetings are conducted 
following the needs of banks. Bank Indonesia and Bank Negara Malaysia as central 
banks have not issued regulations on minimum meetings to be held by the risk 
committee. 
Battaglia and Gallo (2015) examined the risk committee size and risk committee 
meeting as a proxy for risk governance. The test results prove that there is a positive 
relationship between risk committee size and ROA and negative relationship with 
Tobin's q. This suggests that banks with larger risk committees have better 
profitability values. But the expected market assessment (Tobin's Q) in the bank is 
more extensive with a smaller risk committee size. They also found a positive 
relationship between the risk committee meeting and the performance measured by 
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Tobin's q which means the value of the firm will increase with the high number of risk 
committee meeting. 
This research will take the hypothesis with a positive relationship between risk 
committee size and risk committee meeting with banking performance. Agency theory 
states that agency problem arises because of the gap of interest between shareholders 
as the owner of the company with the management as an agent (Nuswandari, 2009). 
The managers tend to dislike risk or risk averse, while the shareholders want to get 
high returns following the statement of "high risk, high return". Therefore the behavior 
can be derived from applying the management supervision by the risk committee. The 
risk committee will also advise on risk appetite to management and provide reports to 
shareholders. Therefore, it will lower the adverse selection. Also, the risk committee 
will manage the bank risks so that the risk does not provide a negative signal to 
external parties. 
H3. Risk committee size positively affects the performance of banks listed on the BEI 
and Bursa Malaysia. 
H2. Risk committee meeting positively affects the performance of banks listed on the 
BEI and Bursa Malaysia. 
 
4. Research Method 
4.1 Population, sample, and data collection method 
We use Indonesian and Malaysian banking data from 2010 to 2014 as samples. 
The samples are determined by using purposive sampling method. The criteria used to 
select the example are as follows: 
1. Banks listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange and Bursa Malaysia. 
2. Banks that published an annual report for period December 31, 2010-2014, at 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and Bursa Malaysia. 
3. Banks that disclosed information on ownership structure and financial ratios 
in its annual report. 
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Data collection method used in this study are documentation and library methods 
obtained from libraries, Bank Indonesia website, official banking website, ASEAN 
official website, and the official website of Indonesia Stock Exchange and Bursa 
Malaysia.  
 
4.2 Variable and measurement 
Dependent variable used in this research is ROA and Tobin's Q as a proxy of 
banking performance. The independent variable used is the variable of risk 
governance. There are four independent variables: board size, board meeting, risk 
committee size, and risk committee meeting. Also, this research also uses the control 
variable in the form of bank size and CAR.  
Table 2 
Operational Variable 
Variable Definition Measurement Source 
Dependent 
Return on 
Asset 
ROA 
Comparison between profit 
before tax and average total 
assets in one period 
Earnings before tax 
x 100% 
           Average of 
total assets  
Financial 
Report 
Tobin’s Q TQ 
The ratio of the firm's 
market value to the cost of 
asset replacement 
 Market value of equity 
+ Book value of liability 
Book value of total 
assets 
Financial 
Report 
Independent 
Board Size BS 
Number of board members 
at the bank7 
∑board members 
Annual 
Report 
Board 
Meeting 
BM 
Number of board meetings 
per year 
∑board meetings 
Annual 
Report 
Risk 
Committee 
Size 
RCS 
Number of risk committee 
members at the bank 
∑risk committee 
members 
Annual 
Report 
Risk 
Committee 
Meeting 
RCM 
Number of risk committee 
meetings per year 
∑risk committee 
meetings 
Annual 
Report 
                                                          
 
7
 In this research, Indonesian bank uses some commissioner members as board size and Malaysian bank uses some 
board members as a board size. 
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Control 
Bank Size lnSIZE Bank size Ln(total asset) 
Financial 
Report 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Ratio 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Bank capital x 
100% 
                      
ATMR 
Financial 
Report 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Chung and Pruitt(1994) 
4.3 Econometric model 
The research method used in this research is quantitative. The technique used is 
multiple regression model, with the aim to know the relationship between a dependent 
variable with some independent variables. The basic model used in this research are as 
follows: 
Model 1  
ROAit  = α0 + α1BSit + α2BMit + α3RCSit + α4RCMit + α5lnSIZEit + α6CARit + eit  
Model 2  
TQit  = β0 + β1BSit + β2BMit + β3RCSit + β4RCMit + β5lnSIZEit + β6CARit + μit  
 
Remarks:  
ROA   = Return On Asset as a dependent variable 
TQ   = Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable 
α0, β0   = constants 
α1–α6, β1- β6  = regression coefficient 
BS   = Board size as independent variable 
BM               = Board meeting as an independent variable  
RCS   = Risk committee size as independent variable 
RCM                 = Risk committee meeting as an independent variable   
lnSIZE  = Bank size as control variable 
CAR               = Capital adequacy ratio as a control variable  
e, μ   = error  
i   = cross section identifiers  
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – May, Vol. 20 , No.2 , 2017 
 
 
298 
t   = time series identifiers 
This study uses sample banks in Indonesia and Malaysia separately so that there 
are four equations. Before performing hypothesis testing, we tested the classical 
assumption of multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity test, and autocorrelation test. 
Multicollinearity test is done by looking at the results of the correlation test table on 
independent variables. If the value of the correlation between independent variables 
below 0.8 then the variable can be said free of multicollinearity. The 
heteroscedasticity test was performed by Park test. The autocorrelation test is done by 
looking at the Durbin-Watson value of the regression result. Regression result is done 
by using a fixed-effect model. 
 
5. Analysis and Results 
5.1 Research samples 
Based on the criteria of sampling that have been described previously, the research 
samples are detailed as follows: 
Table 3  
Research Samples 
No. Bank Name Country No. Bank Name Country 
1 Bank Capital Indonesia Indonesia 15 
Bank Victoria 
International 
Indonesia 
2 Bank Bukopin Indonesia 16 
Bank Artha Graha 
International 
Indonesia 
3 
Bank Negara Indonesia 
(Persero) 
Indonesia 17 
Bank Windu Kentjana 
International  
Indonesia 
4 
Bank Nusantara 
Parahyangan 
Indonesia 18 Bank Mega Indonesia 
5 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(Persero) 
Indonesia 19 Bank NISP OCBC  Indonesia 
6 Bank Danamon Indonesia Indonesia 20 Bank Pan Indonesia Indonesia 
7 Bank Pundi Indonesia Indonesia 21 AMMB Holdings BHD Malaysia 
8 Bank Jabar Banten Indonesia 22 
CIMB Group Holdings 
Berhad 
Malaysia 
9 Bank QNB Indonesia Indonesia 23 Hong Leong Bank BHD Malaysia 
10 Bank Mandiri (Persero) Indonesia 24 
K&N Kenanga Holdings 
Berhad 
Malaysia 
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11 Bank Bumi Arta Indonesia 25 Malayan Banking BHD Malaysia 
12 Bank Permata Indonesia 26 RHB Capital BHD Malaysia 
13 Bank Sinar Mas Indonesia 27 Public Bank BHD Malaysia 
14 
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan 
Nasional 
Indonesia 
   
  
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The statistics table shows that the average ROA and Tobin's q values in 
Indonesian and Malaysian samples are not much different. Meanwhile, the average 
value of board size in Malaysia is higher than Indonesia. This is due to differences in 
the organizational structure used in both countries. The minimum board meeting value 
in the sample of Indonesia is 3, which means that there are still banks in Indonesia 
who held meeting less than the provisions issued by Bank Indonesia, four times per 
year. Whereas in Malaysia the minimum board meeting value is 6, means that all the 
banks have held board meetings following the provisions of Bank Negara Malaysia.  
Furthermore, the average value of risk committee size and risk committee meeting 
on samples of Indonesia and Malaysia is not much different. For risk committee 
meeting value, neither Bank Indonesia nor Bank Negara Malaysia has issued a 
minimum requirement of the meeting. The value of lnSIZE in Malaysian sample 
shows a higher value from Indonesia, and this is because the average value of the asset 
in Malaysian bank is much bigger than Indonesia bank. CAR values in Indonesia and 
Malaysia samples are not much different. 
 
Table 4  
Descriptive Statistic 
  ROA TQ BS BM RCS RCM LNSIZE CAR 
INDONESIA 
 Mean 0,021 1,01 5,47 15,05 4,78 9,8 22,18 0,1676 
 Median 0,0179 0,99 5 11 5 6 22,48 0,1649 
 Maximum 0,0515 1,38 9 55 9 36 24,95 0,2929 
 Minimum 0,0066 0,83 2 3 3 3 19,51 0,1167 
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 Std. Dev. 0,0112 0,11 1,99 13,59 1,7 8,21 1,59 0,0304 
MALAYSIA 
 Mean 0,0133 1,04 10,65 11,94 5,15 8,82 24,52 0,1672 
 Median 0,0138 1,04 11 10 5 7 24,82 0,1465 
 Maximum 0,025 1,39 14 21 10 25 25,93 0,419 
 Minimum 0,0001 0,79 6 6 3 4 20,85 0,1046 
 Std. Dev. 0,0059 0,13 1,76 3,84 2,12 5,01 1,34 0,0731 
Notes : 
ROA = Return On Asset, TQ = Tobin’s Q , BS = Board size, BM = Board meeting, RCS = 
Risk committee size, RCM = Risk committee meeting, lnSIZE = Bank size, CAR = Capital 
adequacy ratio. 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
Source : processed data      
 
Also, there is a correlation table between variables with bank sample in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. In general, board size, board meeting, risk committee size, risk 
committee meeting, bank size, and capital adequacy ratio are positively related to 
return on assets and Tobin's Q with sample banks in Indonesia. In the Malaysian bank 
sample, board size, board meeting, risk committee size, risk committee meeting, and 
bank size are also positively related to return on assets and Tobin's q. 
 
Table 5  
Correlation 
  ROA  TQ  BS  BM  RCS  RCM  LNSIZE  CAR  
INDONESIA 
ROA  1               
TQ  0.5093* 1             
BS  0.4858* 0.2643* 1           
BM  0.2948* 0.0458 0.2438* 1         
RCS  0.4103* 0.2251* 0.7352* 0.0653 1       
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RCM  0.3935* 0.0825 0.4428* 0.6917* 0.1459 1     
LNSIZE  0.6036* 0.3188* 0.7500* 0.3776* 0.6350* 0.4349* 1   
CAR  0.1931* 0.1822* -0,1452 -0,1354 -0,0697 -0,0368 -0,189 1 
MALAYSIA 
ROA  1               
TQ  0.6227* 1             
BS  0.0535 -0,0926 1           
BM  0.5597* 0.5797* 
-
0,4034* 
1         
RCS  0.1688 0.4399* 
-
0,3845* 
0.2246 1       
RCM  0.1147 0.1343 
-
0,7001* 
0.6651* 0.0653 1     
LNSIZE  0.7814* 0.5629* -0,1581 0.3911* 0.3830* 0.1394 1   
CAR  -0,607* 
-
0,4106* 
0,277 -0,2728 
-
0,3353* 
-0,1834 -0,8862* 1 
Notes : 
ROA = Return On Asset, TQ = Tobin’s Q , BS = Board size, BM = Board meeting, RCS = 
Risk committee size, RCM = Risk committee meeting, lnSIZE = Bank size, CAR = Capital 
adequacy ratio. 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
Source : processed data      
 
6. Results 
The test results show that the independent variables in the equation have met the 
non-multicollinearity requirements. The correlation value between independent 
variables indicates this is below 0.8. Multicollinearity test results of independent 
variables can be seen in table 5 previous correlation. This study also used Park's test to 
find out whether or not heteroscedasticity in regression results. Park test with bank 
samples in Indonesia and Malaysia show that there was heteroscedasticity. This is 
eliminated by applying the white-heteroscedasticity test. This study uses the Durbin-
Watson test as a way to detect autocorrelation. Regression equation results passed the 
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autocorrelation test if the value of DW-stat is between the value 1.54-2.46. The result 
of autocorrelation test on regression result of equation 2 with a sample of bank 
Indonesia and equation 1 with sample bank in Malaysia which indicate the problem of 
autocorrelation, therefore repaired by using AR (1) in regression. 
The following table is the regression results of the four equations using the fixed 
effect model. From the regression results in the first model with the Indonesian bank, 
samples show the adjusted R-squared value of 0.8834. From the regression results in 
the second model with the Indonesian bank, samples show the adjusted R-squared 
value of 0.7830. Furthermore, from the regression results in the first model with 
Malaysian bank samples shows an adjusted R-squared of 0.9091. The regression 
results in the second model with Malaysian bank samples shows an adjusted R-
squared value of 0.5340. The four models have an F-statistic probability value less 
than 0.05 which means that the independent variable can explain the dependent 
variable significantly. 
 
Table 6  
Regression Results 
Independent 
Variable 
INDONESIA MALAYSIA 
ROA TQ ROA TQ 
C  -0.065475 -4,49526 0.425511 -1,91323 
BS 0.000913*** 0.011458 0.000314 -0.008275 
BM 0.000144** 0.002854 0.000483*** 0.016763 
RCS 0.001728*** 0.003109 -0.000358 0.036898*** 
RCM 0.000116* -0.002249** 0.000165* 0.000745 
lnSIZE 0.003272 0.240488*** -0.016947*** 0.108818 
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CAR -0.015636 0.416417* -0.006563 -0.163656 
DW - stat 1,95703 2,315871 1,758701 1,852031 
Notes : 
ROA = Return On Asset, TQ = Tobin’s Q , BS = Board size, BM = Board meeting, RCS = 
Risk committee size, RCM = Risk committee meeting, lnSIZE = Bank size, CAR = Capital 
adequacy ratio. 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
Source : processed data  
The results of this study found that the performance of Indonesian banks as 
measured by return on assets is not only influenced by corporate governance variables 
but also risk governance variables, particularly risk committee size and risk committee 
meeting. The increasing number of risk committees and risk committee meetings will 
further increase the level of profitability in Indonesian banks. These results support 
previous studies of Battaglia and Gallo (2015) and support FSB recommendations 
(2013) on improving the risk governance framework. Specific risk monitoring should 
be done to prevent risks that may occur in bank activities. If such risks can be avoided, 
then it would be able to execute operational activities at the bank. 
However, the results of this study indicate that the performance of Indonesian 
banks as measured by Tobin's q is only influenced by the risk governance variables, 
which is the number of risk committee meetings. There is a negative relationship 
between Tobin's q with the number of risk committee meetings. The more meetings 
conducted by the directors will get the stock market price of Indonesian bank lower. 
The frequent risk committee meeting has resulted in ineffective results, thus lowering 
the bank's stock price. 
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The implication of this research is to improve supervision and risk governance 
framework that will enhance banking performance. Regulators may use the results of 
this study to emphasize the realization of risk governance to banks as recommended 
by the FSB and BCBS. Also, the results of this study can provide evidence to the 
academics that risk governance has a significant positive effect on return on assets in 
2010 to 2014 period. The results can be considered to do the next research. 
The result of the research with Malaysian bank samples proves that the 
performance as measured by return on assets is only influenced by the number of 
directors and risk committee meetings variables. The results show the number of 
directors and risk committees meetings affect the return on assets positively. The high 
number of meetings will give effective decisions thus increase profitability. The 
number of board and risk committees members do not affect the return on assets. 
The results of this research prove that the number of risk committees variable 
affects the bank performance as positively measured by Tobin's q. This supports the 
recommendations issued by the FSB (2013) on improving oversight and risk 
governance frameworks. The higher the number of risk committees, the higher the 
level of supervision by risk committees in preventing the risk of banking, thus 
increasing the stock market price of the bank. 
7. Conclusion, Limitation, and Conclusions 
7.1 Conclusion 
The results show that the risk governance variables affect the performance of 
banks measured by return on assets. The increasing number of risk committees in 
Indonesian banks can increase certain risk control thus reduce the level of risk 
occurrence in banks. Following agency theory which states agency problem arises 
because of two different interests of both parties, this can be derived from the risk 
committee supervision. Also, the more meetings held by the risk committee, the more 
effective decision will be provided so that it increases the profitability in the bank. The 
results of this study support the recommendations issued by the FSB (2013) to 
improve the supervision of risk governance in banks. However, the results of this 
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study also indicate that the increasing number of meetings conducted by the risk 
committee can reduce the value of the company. We suspect that the presence of risk 
committee meetings carried out a negative impression on market reaction. Investors 
may know the causes of meetings that were being held by risk committees. 
The results also show that bank profitability in Malaysia as measured by return on 
assets is only influenced by the number of meetings conducted by boards and risk 
committees. More meetings by boards or risk committees will increase profitability in 
Malaysian banks. More time for discussion can yield more effective outcomes or 
decisions. The research’s results also prove that the number of risk committees on 
Malaysian banks affect the value of the company. A high number of risk committees 
will increase the level of supervision by risk committees in preventing the risk of 
banking. Thus it is increasing the stock market price of the bank.  
 
7.2 Limitation and Suggestion 
Limitation 
We deal with some limitations in this research. First, this research only uses a 
sample of banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and Bursa Malaysia. Second, 
the observation period of this 5-year research will limit the analysis of long-term 
performance. Third, the proxy used in this research is a return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin's Q. The governance characteristics in this research are still limited to the board 
of directors and risk committees that focus on supervision activities.  
Suggestion 
Further research is expected to use research samples such as banking in Southeast 
Asia or others so that the results can be compared with various countries and can be 
generalized. Also, further research is also expected to use samples of other financial 
institutions. Second, new research is expected to employ more extended period so that 
the study can predict banking performance in the long-term. Third, further research is 
expected to use not only the proxy of ROA and Tobin's Q but also add other variables 
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such as ROE, BOPO, P/E, and so forth. Further research is also expected to use more 
complete and specific governance proxy, such as the level of work experience of 
directors and risk committees so that the results can explain precisely what factors that 
can affect banking performance. 
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